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Abstract—We observed that safety arguments are prone to
stay too abstract, e.g. solutions refer to large packages, argument
strategies to complex reasoning steps, contexts and assumptions
lack traceability. These issues can reduce the confidence we
require of such arguments. In this paper, we investigate the
construction of confident arguments from (i) hazard analysis
(HA) results and (ii) the design of safety measures, i.e., both
used for confidence evaluation. We present an argument pattern
integrating three HA techniques, i.e., FTA, FMEA, and STPA, as
well as the reactions on the results of these analyses, i.e., safety
requirements and design increments. We provide an example of
how our pattern can help in argument construction and discuss
steps towards using our pattern in formal analysis and computer-
assisted construction of safety cases.
Index Terms—FTA, FMEA, STPA, safety case, assurance case,
hazard analysis, argument, pattern, scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
We give a short introduction into safety cases, safety argu-
ments, goal structures, and hazard analysis (HA), point out one
important problem we perceive when building safety cases,
and, finally, provide an approach to solve this problem.
A. Background and Terminology
According to Bishop and Bloomfield [1], a safety case1
should comprehensibly convey a valid argument that a specific
system is acceptably safe in a specific operational context.
Hereby, the safety argument captures the reasoning from basic
facts—the evidence—towards the claims to be established—
the safety goals. Graphs called goal structures represent and
document such an argument [2]. To make the process of
safety case construction more systematic, several authors [3],
[4] propose argument patterns and provide a structure for
developing lower level patterns.
Hazard identification relies on expert knowledge, e.g. in
terms of guide words or defect classifications, identifying
types of component failures [5], [6], defects in software
processes [7], accident causal factors [8], and destructive goals
for software tests [9]. Hazard analysis as an activity in any
safety engineering life cycle deals with causal reasoning,
i.e., establishing causal relationships between events. Causal
*IEEE Reference Format: Gleirscher, M. & Carlan, C. Arguing from
Hazard Analysis in Safety Cases: A Modular Argument Pattern. High
Assurance Systems Engineering (HASE), 18th Int. Symp., 2017, DOI:
10.1109/HASE.2017.15.
1The discussion of how our approach relates to the more general concepts
of assurance case and dependability case is out of scope of this paper.
reasoning can be inductive, i.e., from causal events up to their
effect events, or deductive, i.e., from effect events down to
their causal events. We focus on three widely used techniques:
• fault-tree analysis (FTA), which looks at critical paths,
i.e., combinations of causal factors leading to an unde-
sired event with high probability [10],
• failure-mode-effects-analysis (FMEA), which helps iden-
tify failure modes of items and their propagation towards
hazardous system-level effects [10], and
• system-theoretic process analysis (STPA), one of the
most recently developed techniques, which applies con-
trol structure models and control action guide words to
determine causal factors [11].
For a detailed description of FTA and FMEA techniques see
[10] and for STPA see [11]. In Sec. II-C, we provide descrip-
tions for the non-expert reader to gain a further understanding.
B. Motivation and Challenges
Fenelon et al. [12] discuss a method where they intertwine
software HA with design increments as countermeasures for
identified hazards. Hawkins et al. [13] elaborate a tool chain
for constructing safety cases from modeled design increments.
Safety arguments are required to be valid with high con-
fidence [14], [15]. The achievement of this depends on the
amount of details an argument should have [16]. Staying too
abstract is among the many obstacles to the achievement of
high confidence. We point at several problems, e.g. solutions
based on FTA can refer to large packages [2, pp. 319f,136],
argumentation strategies can encompass fairly complex rea-
soning steps [4, pp. 17ff][17, p. 102], context and assumption
statements can lack fine-granular traceability [17, p. 111].
These examples show that it is difficult to build up a compre-
hensible and traceable safety argument from the HA results
and the corresponding reactions. These problems can
• significantly reduce the confidence we are able to asso-
ciate with such an argument and, consequently,
• hinder systematic reuse of proven arguments.
Related issues were recognized by, e.g. Yuan and Xu [18].
C. Contributions
In this paper, we seek to reduce the mentioned issues and
improve safety case methodology. Argument patterns based on
evidence from FTA and FMEA have been discussed in [19],
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Argument based on mitigating 
hazards identified from several 
sources
Argument based on the reasoning 
underlying a specific technique (e.g. FTA, 
FMEA, or STPA)
Argument based on the evidence from FTA, 
FMEA, or STPA (e.g. causal factors) and 
countermeasures
supported by
supported by
Module M
Module CR
Module HC
(a) Module overview
G1
System {S} is free of 
identified hazards
       S1 [T]
Argument over mitigation 
of all identified hazards 
from [HC]
G2 [T]
System {S} is free of 
identified [HC]
G2.1
[HC] {H} is sufficiently 
reduced by [CMT]
  C1
System definition 
{S}
  C2
System boundary 
{SB}
N
HC
N = # identified hazards
(b) Argument pattern for module M
Figure 1: Module overview and main module M
[4]. Confidence arguments have to provide insight on how this
evidence was generated [16]. In addition to these patterns, we
discuss a pattern that zooms into the evidence mentioned by
the existing approaches by using causal reasoning evidence
and the evidence from developing mitigations of identified
hazards. Our pattern helps at collecting more evidence on
how the analysis is performed. Instead of creating an argument
from error-prone experience, we propose a systematic way of
guiding the argument from well understood steps performed in
HA to increase the trustworthiness of the evidence. Hence, the
structure of our pattern resembles the causal reasoning of HA.
Moreover, the pattern adds value to HA results by integrating
these results with the additional steps required in the construc-
tion of confident safety cases. We provide reusable argument
modules for different assurance concerns, particularly, arguing
for a system redesign based on the identified hazards.
Outline: Sec. II describes a pattern using goal structures
to represent safety arguments from FTA, FMEA, and STPA to
substantiate safety cases. In Sec. III, we provide an example
of a train door control system as a basis for applying this
pattern. Sec. IV discusses several aspects of the pattern. We
close our paper with an analysis of related work (Sec. V) and
conclusions in Sec. VI.
II. A MODULAR ARGUMENT PATTERN
Fig. 1a describes an argument pattern in three modules: A
Module M describing the part of a safety argument based
on mitigating hazards from various categories, a Module CR
depicting the part of an argument underlying a specific HA
technique, and a Module HC to form detailed arguments from
the reactions after applying a specific technique.
A. Concepts, Notation, and Assumptions
Concepts: All modules are built around the concepts of
• hazard, e.g. failure mode or effect in FMEA; minimum
cutset, critical path, or top-level event in FTA; causal
factor or unsafe control action in STPA; and
• countermeasure, e.g. corrective action in FMEA or safety
constraint in STPA (see Sec. II-B for further concepts).
Countermeasures can range from 1) a specification document
containing functional or quality requirements and design con-
straints (to be implemented by hardware, software, the human
(G)oal Y
Statement possibly using 
introduced parameters such 
as {par}.
      (S)trategy S
    Argument from other goals 
possibly depending on some 
parameters such as {par}.
(G)oal Z
To be further developed 
goal.
     (C)ontext C
Statement relating an 
element to a certain 
context, e.g. a 
subsystem
   (J)ustification J
Explanatory statement, 
e.g. why a specific 
strategy can be 
applied.
(S)olutio(n) E.
Reference to 
development 
artifact.
       (S)trategy T
To be further 
developed strategy. 
N
(G)oal X
Statement describing a goal 
introducing parameters {par}.
m of n
inContextOf
supportedBy
Multiplicity, N = # of 
subjects to set goals for
Option with 
choice     
restriction
     (A)ssumption A
Statement describing 
conditions out of 
control but assumed to 
hold.
J
A
Figure 2: GSN legend. Nodes contain element descriptions.
machine interface or the operator), over 2) corresponding
design changes based on system models or implementa-
tion artifacts such as the application of dependability design
patterns, to 3) process requirements specifying work steps
such as design review, verification, test, or maintenance to be
conducted at certain points in the system life cycle.
Notation: The notation, we use in Figs. 1b to 14b,
complies with the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN, [19]) and
is described in Fig. 2. We distinguish between parameters
for pattern refinement (indicated by square brackets “[]”) and
for pattern instantiation (indicated by curly brackets “{}”).
GSN is one way of visualizing argumentation in safety cases.
However, the following approach should, in principle, work
with any means used to visualize assurance argumentation.
Assumptions: Similar to Hawkins et al. [13], we assume
model-based development to be a basis for constructing the
parts of the argument referring to system design increments.
Hence, these increments refer to a system model describing
design-related safety measures to be implemented. The imple-
mentation then needs to be verified against the model and the
requirements to complete the argument.
B. Module M: Arguing from Hazard Mitigation
Module M describes an argument pattern which aims at
coverage of two main categories of hazards we focus2 on,
i.e., hazardous single-point3 failures (objective of FMEA) and
hazardous system-level events (objective of FTA and STPA).
The goal structure in Fig. 1b therefor contains a multiplicity
over the parameter HC (hazard category). Furthermore, the
parameter CMT ranges over the terms countermeasure (univer-
sal), design revision (universal), safety constraint (STPA), cor-
rective action (FMEA), and process-based measure (FMEA).
Figs. 3a and 3b refine module M via HC.
C. Module CR: Arguing from Causal Reasoning
Here, we provide three argument patterns incorporating the
type of causal reasoning underlying FTA, STPA, and FMEA.
2Motivated from Sec. I-A, these two categories cover a large subclass of
identifiable and important hazards.
3For sake of simplicity, we do not discuss common cause failures which,
however, can be covered by specific variants of FMEA and FTA.
G1
System {S} is free of 
identified hazards
    S1 FTA/STPA
Argument over mitigation 
of all identified hazardous 
system-level events
G2 FTA/STPA
System {S} is free of 
identified hazardous 
system-level events
G2.1
Hazardous system-level 
event {E} is suf- 
ficiently reduced by 
countermeasures
   C1
System definition {S}
A1
All hazardous 
system-level events 
are identified from 
the system-level 
events
  C2
System boundary {SB}
N
A
N = # hazardous system-
level events
(a) Strategy 1 for FTA and STPA
G1
System {S} is free of 
identified hazards
    S1 FMEA
Argument over miti-
gation of all hazardous 
failure modes
G2 FMEA
System {S} is free of 
identified hazards from 
single point failures
G2.1
Hazardous failure mode 
{FM} is sufficiently reduced 
by corrective actions
C1
System definition {S}
A1
Single-point failures 
only stem from single 
failure modes
  C2
System boundary {SB}
N
J1
All hazardous failure 
effects identified from 
the failure modes are 
sufficiently 
eliminated
A
J
N = # failure modes
(b) Strategy 1 for FMEA
Figure 3: Refinements of Fig. 1b for FTA, STPA, and FMEA
G2.1.1
Minimum cutset {C} is a 
critical path to {E}
        S2
Argument over elimination of all 
critical paths which determine 
{E} by design revisions 
G2.1.2
Design revision {DR} for 
elimination of minimum 
cutset {C} has been 
conducted.
 C3
Revised design
     J2
{C} is among the cutsets 
with the highest probability
    J1
Critical paths are the most 
important cutsets to eliminate 
and they form the compound 
hazard underlying {E} 
Sn1 
Cutset 
analysis for 
E from FTA 
report
G2.1
Hazardous system-level event {E} is 
sufficiently reduced by countermeasures
N
       S3
Argument over elimination 
of {E} by process-based 
measure
1 of 2
J
J
N = # critical paths to {E} 
Figure 4: Module CR argument pattern for FTA
1) Commonalities among the Techniques: By the “1-out-
of-2” choice in Figs. 4 to 6, the pattern allows to complement
design revisions with process-based measures, e.g. unit tests,
material quality checks, reviews. This distinction allows us to
construct an argument along these two commonly used lines
of argumentation (see, e.g. [20]).
2) Argument based on FTA: The main part of the argu-
ment in Fig. 4 contains the elimination of all critical paths
(Strategy 2), i.e., the minimum cutsets C with comparably
high probabilities, leading to an undesired system-level event
E. Strategy 2 can be used to construct arguments over the (i)
elimination of critical paths, or (ii) the reduction of failure
rates of these critical paths below an acceptable maximum.
Both approaches, (i) and (ii), are associated with a design
revision DR. The multiplicity helps to argue over arbitrarily
many relevant pairs (C,DR). By C2 in Fig. 3a, we consider
system-level events E as top-level events of an FTA.
Notes on Construction: As opposed to the fault-tree
evidence pattern described in [2, pp. 186f] and following FTA
deductive causal reasoning, we consider this pattern being used
to construct an argument top-down from Goal 2.1.
3) Argument based on FMEA: The main part of the argu-
ment shown in Fig. 5 pertains Strategy 2 which argues over a
correctly identified failure mode FM with high risk priority
number (RPN) and a corresponding design revision DR taken
to mitigate FM . The multiplicity allows FM to be mitigated
by arbitrarily many recorded design revisions.
G2.1.1
Failure mode {FM} is identified 
as one with unacceptably high RPN.
      S2
    Argument over mitigation 
of {FM} by design revisions
G2.1.2
Design revision {DR} 
for mitigation of failure 
mode {FM} 
has been conducted.
  C3
Revised design
     J2
We correct all failure 
modes with unacceptably 
severe consequences, also 
called failure effects.
Sn1
FMEA report, 
failure effects 
of {FM}
       S3
Argument over mitigation of {FM} 
by process-based measure
Sn2
FMEA  
report, RPN 
of {FM}
N
G2.1
Hazardous failure mode {FM} is 
sufficiently reduced by corrective actions
1 of 2
     C4
The risk priority number 
(RPN) is a measure to 
classify hazards
J
N = # design revisions and 
other corrective actions 
Figure 5: Module CR argument pattern for FMEA
G2.1.3
Unsafe control action 
{UCA} for {H} is 
identified
        S2
Argument over elimination of all unsafe control 
actions and hazards that increase the risk of {A} 
by safety constraints and corresponding 
design revisions 
G2.1.5
Design revision {DR} for 
mitigation of unsafe control 
action {UCA} and hazard {H} 
has been conducted.
         C4
Revised design, operating 
procedures, and assump-tions 
on operational context
G2.1
Hazardous system-level event 
{A} is sufficiently reduced by 
countermeasures
N
Sn A 
STPA report, 
potential 
accident
Sn H 
STPA report, 
associated 
hazard from 
Sn Model
STPA report, 
control structure 
diagram, control 
actions, process 
model and variables
Sn CF 
STPA report, 
causal factor
Sn UCA 
STPA report, 
control action
G2.1.1
Accident from 
{A} is identified
G2.1.2
Hazard {H} for 
{A} is identified
G2.1.4
Causal factor {CF} 
of {UCA} is 
identified
       C3
We consider an accident {A} as a 
combination of a hazard {H}, i.e. a 
system-level event {E}, and certain 
environmental conditions.
       S3
Argument over elimination 
of UCA and hazards of {A} by 
process-based measure
1 of 2
N = # unsafe control actions
Figure 6: Module CR argument pattern for STPA
Notes on Construction: We consider this pattern being
used to construct an argument top-down from Goal 2.1.
This CR pattern, particularly Strategy 2, inverts the FMEA
inductive causal reasoning in the sense that the elimination
of hazardous failure effects (Goal 2) from failure modes is
established by building up the goal structure in a top-down
manner, i.e., descending from Goal 2 towards Goal 2.1.1.
4) Argument based on STPA: To reuse Module M from
FTA, we use the concepts hazard H and accident A to
form the hazardous system-level event E. In the context of
STPA, Goal 2.1 can be interpreted as a reduction of the
probabilities of the identified accidents A by mitigation of
their corresponding hazards H .
The CR pattern for STPA (Fig. 6) works similar to the one
for FTA (Fig. 4). However, it is more elaborate in terms of the
concepts used to decompose the chain of evidence in causal
reasoning and the goals. Based on an identified accident A,
Strategy 2 argues over the elimination of all unsafe control
actions UCA and corresponding hazards H (Goals 2.1.2 to
2.1.4) by design measures (Goal 2.1.5).
Notes on Construction: Similar to the FTA deductive
causal reasoning, we consider this pattern mainly being ap-
G2.1.x
Design revision {DR} for 
[CT] {Refs} was conducted.
G2.1.x.1
New requirements 
{R} specify {DR} for 
[CT] {Refs}
   C6
Requirements for 
[CT] {Ref} in [AT] 
report
     C5
System model
A3
The task for {DR} 
adequately tackles {R} 
identified for [CT] 
{Refs} in [AT] report 
Sn5 
Verification 
report
G2.1.x.2
The task for {DR} 
has been performed
G2.1.x.3
[CT] {Refs} has been 
correctly done during 
the design revision 
task
G2.1.x.3.1
Verification proves 
that {DR}  
implements {R} 
derived from [AT]
Sn4
 [Model 
elements] that 
represent {DR} 
for [CT] {Refs}
Sn3
[AT] report, 
requirements 
identified for 
[CT] {Refs}
A
Figure 7: Generic argument pattern for module HC
plicable in top-down argumentation from Goal 2.1. However,
the Goals 2.1.1 to 2.1.4 might be elaborated
1) from left to right, e.g. if we want to follow STPA starting
with accident analysis, or
2) from right to left, e.g. if we want to study the causal
factors resulting from a former safety case or a former
accident investigation and follow the course of events.
D. Module HC: Arguing from Hazard Countermeasures
The goal structures of this module argue over evidence from
results of the applied (i) HA techniques, i.e., hazards, and (ii)
assurance techniques, i.e., countermeasures (see Sec. II-A).
Now, we describe a generic argument pattern for module HC
followed by three refinements for FTA, FMEA, and STPA.
1) Generic Argument: In Fig. 7, the Goal 2.1.x mentions
the parameter CT which denotes the type of cause to be
mitigated, treated, or eliminated together with a specifier Refs
as explained below. Furthermore, the parameter AT refers to
the analysis technique from which the corresponding evidence
(i.e., solutions) can be collected. The requirements R identified
for the design revision DR according to Goal 2.1.x.1 are
implemented by Goal 2.1.x.2 and verified after Goal 2.1.x.3.
2) Argument based on FTA: Fig. 8 refines the argument
of Fig. 7: The parameter CT is substituted by “eliminating
minimum cutset (MCS)” and Refs by a parameter {C} to
specify a minimum cutset. AT is set to FTA.
3) Argument based on FMEA: Fig. 9 refines the argument
of Fig. 7: The parameter CT is substituted by “mitigating
failure mode” and Refs by a parameter {FM} to specify a
failure mode. AT is substituted by FMEA.
4) Argument based on STPA: In STPA, safety constraints
are requirements which constrain the control system structure
and behavior such that unsafe control actions and, in turn,
hazards are mitigated at specification level. Fig. 10 refines the
argument of Fig. 7 by setting the parameter CT to “mitigation
of unsafe control action and hazard” and Refs to {UCA} and
{H}. Specific to the work steps in STPA, we propose a “1-
out-of-2” choice depending on whether the safety constraints
(i.e., specific requirements) have been derived from an unsafe
control action UCA (instantiating the parameter SCA), from
G2.1.2
Design revision {DR} for eliminating 
MCS {C} has been conducted.
G2.1.2.1
New requirements 
{R} specify {DR} for 
eliminating MCS {C}
   C5
Requirements for 
eliminating MCS 
{C} in FTA report
     C4
System model, MCS = 
minimum cut set
A3
The task for {DR} 
adequately tackles {R} 
identified for eliminating 
MCS {C} in FTA report 
Sn4 
Verification 
report
G2.1.2.2
The task for {DR} 
has been performed
G2.1.2.3
MCS {C} has been 
correctly eliminated 
during the design 
revision task
G2.1.2.3.1
Verification proves 
that {DR}  
implements {R} 
derived from FTA
Sn3
 [Model 
elements] that 
represent {DR} 
for eliminating 
MCS {C}
Sn2
FTA report, 
requirements 
identified for 
eliminating 
MCS {C}
A
Figure 8: Refinement of Fig. 7 for FTA
G2.1.2
Design revision {DR} for mitigating failure 
mode {FM} has been conducted.
G2.1.2.1
New requirements 
{R} specify {DR} for 
mitigating failure 
mode {FM}
   C6
Requirements for 
mitigating failure 
mode {FM} in 
FMEA report
     C5
System model
A3
The task for {DR} 
adequately tackles {R} 
identified for mitigating 
failure mode {FM} in 
FMEA report 
Sn5 
Verification 
report
G2.1.2.2
The task for {DR} 
has been performed
G2.1.2.3
Failure mode {FM} has 
been correctly mitigated 
during the design revision 
task
G2.1.2.3.1
Verification proves 
that {DR}  
implements {R} 
derived from FMEA
Sn4
 [Model 
elements] that 
represent {DR} 
for mitigating 
failure mode 
{FM}
Sn3
FMEA report, 
requirements 
identified for 
mitigating failure 
mode {FM}
A
Figure 9: Refinement of Fig. 7 for FMEA
a hazard H (instantiating the parameter SCH), or from both.
Finally, AT is substituted by STPA.
III. APPLICATION: TRAIN DOOR CONTROL SYSTEM
In this section, we discuss a simplified train door control
system (TDCS) as an example of a safety-critical software-
based system in the public train systems domain.
A. Information about the System
Features: Our TDCS is responsible for operating a single
door unit, i.e., opening doors according to passengers’ or
train conductor’s requests, closing doors according to train
conductor’s requests, both only in appropriate situations.
System-level Safety Requirements (SR): After train-level
hazard identification, a TDCS has to particularly fulfill train-
level safety requirements such as, e.g.
SR1 locking the doors closed while the train is moving,
SR2 preventing the train from moving while the doors are
not locked,
SR3 not harming humans residing in the doorway,
SR4 allowing manual opening after the train stopped in
case of an emergency.
System Structure: Fig. 11 shows a simplified control loop
with the main components of the TDCS.
        S3
Argument over elaborating design revisions from 
safety constraints {SCH} and {SCA} for 
mitigation of UCA {UCA} and hazard {H}
Sn SCH 
STPA report, 
safety constraint 
{SCH} identified 
for hazard {H}
Sn SCA 
STPA report, 
safety constraint 
{SCA} 
identified for 
UCA {UCA}
G2.1.5
Design revision {DR} for 
mitigation of UCA {UCA} 
and hazard {H} has been 
conducted.
G2.1.5.1
New requirements {SCA} 
and {SCH} specify {DR} 
for mitigation of UCA 
{UCA} and hazard {H}
   C6
Requirements for 
mitigation of UCA 
{UCA} and hazard 
{H} in STPA report
     C5
System model, UCA = 
unsafe control action
A3
The task for {DR} 
adequately tackles 
{SCA},{SCH} identified for 
mitigation of UCA {UCA} 
and hazard {H} in STPA 
report 
Sn 5 
Verification 
report
G2.1.5.2
The task for {DR} 
has been performed
G2.1.5.3
UCA {UCA} and 
hazard {H} have been 
correctly mitigated 
during the design 
revision task
G2.1.5.3.1
Verification proves 
that {DR}  
implements {SCA}, 
{SCH} derived from 
STPA
Sn 4
 [Model elements] 
that represent 
{DR} for 
mitigation of 
UCA {UCA} and 
hazard {H}
1 of 2
Figure 10: Refinement of Fig. 7 for STPA
Door Actuators
(e.g. motors, warning 
lamps, loud speakers)
Door Sensors
(e.g. position, health 
monitoring)
Door Controller
(Embedded software 
system)
Controlled Process
(e.g. door unit)
Signals from train operating 
system (e.g. conductor)
Control signals
(e.g. open, close, lock)
Process influence by 
automated operation
Physical sensing
Observed signals 
(e.g. from position and 
obstacle detectors, motor, 
health monitoring, etc.
Process influence by 
manual operation
(door HMI)
Control signals 
by passenger
(door HMI)
Process signals to 
passengers 
(door HMI)
Figure 11: Control structure diagram of a simple TDCS
B. Application of Module M
We applied FTA and FMEA to our TDCS. Hence, our goal
structure is complete in the sense of capturing both causal
reasoning directions, inductive and deductive.
Fig. 12 applies module M by substituting S for TDCS,
using the refined patterns for FMEA and FTA for the two
hazardous system-level events “door remains closed in case
of emergency” (derived from SR4) and “train departs with
open doors” (derived from SR1 and SR2), and the two failure
modes “door controller calculates wrong door position” and
“lack of power supply for H-bridge.” For sake of brevity, we
left most context, assumption, and justification elements away.
Please, consider the pattern description in Sec. II.
C. Application of Module CR
Module CR-FTA: In Fig. 13a, we show a breakdown
of the goal structure for the event “train departs with open
doors.” We show the cutset “optical encoder broken or faulty,
additional infrared sensors faulty” as an example. This cutset
was determined a as critical path by FTA. We only consider
one critical path in this example. Goal 2.1.2 requires a design
G1
TDCS is free of hazards
        S1 FTA/STPA
Argument over mitigation of all 
hazardous system-level events
G2 FTA/STPA 
TDCS is free of hazardous 
system-level events
G2.1
Hazardous system-level 
event  door remains 
closed in case of an 
emergency  is suf- 
ficiently reduced by 
countermeasures
              S1 FMEA
Argument over mitigation of all 
hazardous failure modes
G2 FMEA
TDCS is free of hazards 
from single point failures
G2.1
 Door controller calculates 
wrong door position  is 
sufficiently reduced by 
corrective actions
G2.1
 Lack of power-supply 
for H-bridge  is 
sufficiently reduced by 
corrective actions
......
G2.1
Hazardous system-level 
event  train departs 
with open doors  is suf- 
ficiently reduced by 
countermeasures
Figure 12: Application of module M to TDCS
G2.1.1
Minimum cutset  optical encoder (OE) broken, OE 
faulty, add. infrared sensors faulty  is a critical path 
to  train departs with open doors 
           S2
Argument over elimination of all critical paths which determine 
 train departs with open doors  by design revisions 
G2.1.2
Design revision RS for elimination of 
minimum cutset  optical encoder 
broken, OE faulty, add. infrared sensors 
faulty  has been conducted.
Sn1 
Cutset 
analysis from 
FTA report
G2.1
Hazardous system-level event  train departs 
with open doors  is sufficiently reduced by 
countermeasures
...
(a) For FTA
G2.1.1
 Door controller calculates 
wrong door position  is 
identified as one with 
unacceptably high RPN.
      S2
    Argument over mitigation of  door 
controller calculates wrong door 
position  by design revisions
G2.1.2a
Design revision RS for 
mitigation of failure mode 
 door controller calculates 
wrong door position  
has been conducted.
Sn1
FMEA report, 
failure effects of 
 door controller 
calculates wrong 
door position 
       S3
Argument over mitigation of  door 
controller calculates wrong door position  
by process-based measure
Sn2
FMEA report, 
RPN of  door 
controller 
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Figure 13: Application of module CR to TDCS
revision identified by “robust sensors (RS)” to be successfully
conducted. We discuss this in Sec. III-D.
Module CR-FMEA: Fig. 13b indicates how FMEA en-
riches our argument. For Goal 2.1, we pick the failure mode
“door controller calculates wrong door position” whose reduc-
tion is argued by two strategies: Strategy 2 builds on correct
identification of this failure mode (Goal 2.1.1) and on two
design revisions RS and FDC (Goals 2.1.2a and b). Strategy
3 builds on measures in the system integration process, i.e., a
“check for correct wiring and sensor application” (Goal 2.1.3).
Again, we only consider one failure mode.
G2.1.2
Design revision RS for elimination of minimum 
cutset  optical encoder broken, OE faulty, add. 
infrared sensors faulty  has been conducted.
G2.1.2.1
New requirements  robust sensors  
specify RS for eliminating MCS 
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add. infrared sensors faulty 
Sn4 
Verification 
report
G2.1.2.2
The task for RS has 
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G2.1.2.3
MCS  optical encoder broken, OE 
faulty, add. infrared sensors faulty  
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G2.1.2.3.1
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Sn3
 Choice of specific 
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 optical encoder 
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identified fOr 
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 optical encoder 
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add. infrared sensors 
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(a) For FTA
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G2.1.2.1
Req.  controller detects data 
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calculates wrong door position 
Sn5 
Verification 
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G2.1.2.2
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G2.1.2.3
 Door controller calculates wrong door 
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the design revision task
G2.1.2.3.1
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Figure 14: Application of module HC to TDCS
D. Application of Module HC
According to Sec. III-C and Fig. 13a, Fig. 14a shows the
breakdown of Goal 2.1.2 by which we get an argument for
having eliminated this specific critical path.
Fig. 14b shows an argument to mitigate the failure mode
identified in Fig. 13b: The requirement “controller detects data
inconsistencies” specifies a task to build a “fault-detection for
the controller (FDC)” which is (i) conducted when we gain
evidence for Goal 2.1.2.2 by Solution 4, and (ii) verified as
soon as we get evidence for Goal 2.1.2.3 by Solution 5.
IV. DISCUSSION
In this section, we reflect on the presented argument pattern
and its application to the TDCS.
A. Preliminary Evaluation in the Student Lab
We developed our pattern for a practical course in safety
analysis with 18 master students.4 This course was combined
with an experiment on the comparison of the effectiveness of
FTA, FMEA, and STPA.5 After being trained in these tech-
niques, the students worked in groups of three to perform HA
for three different systems, an automotive anti-lock braking
system, an air traffic collision avoidance system, and a TDCS.
4See http://www4.in.tum.de/∼gleirsch/safety/index.shtml.
5Detailed results will be published apart from this paper.
Next, the students (i) developed safety measures for the
hazards they identified by using the three techniques and
(ii) constructed a safety argument. In an extra tutorial on
safety cases, we showed them a first version of our pattern
to help them structure their arguments. This way, we could
determine whether trained students were able to apply our
pattern in their assurance tasks. The submissions showed that
4 out of the 6 groups were able to directly use our pattern to
create an argument from their previous analysis. Finally, this
approach helped us to understand and refine our pattern before
evaluating it in a more critical practical context.
B. Structuring the Argument
Here, we discuss insights from applying our pattern in the
course assignments. From the construction notes in Sec. II,
we conclude that our argument is to be built top-down. The
structuring is difficult because of the many criteria and ways
available to do this. We found the following classification
criteria and steps helpful to keep the argument compact:
(1) Breakdown of items (i.e., system functions, components),
(2a) hazard analysis technique,
(2b) hazards and measures common across the techniques,
(3a) requirement types (i.e., functional, quality, constraint,
process, see Sec. II-A) and clusters,
(3b) solution clusters.
For (1), item-related structuring • determines analysis granu-
larity in FTA, FMEA, and STPA, • structures requirements de-
rived from the identified hazards, and • scopes design revisions
implementing (functional) requirements. For (3), requirements
(Goal 2.1.2.1) motivating design revisions (e.g. Goal 2.1.2 in
Fig. 14a) can be clustered according to their (i) type, and (ii)
the class and severity rating of the hazard they were associated
with (e.g. intermittent failure mode in highest RPN range).
We found that these criteria can be used in two sequences:
(1)→ (2)→ (3) or (2)→ (1)→ (3).
C. Commonalities and Relationships among the Modules
The modules M and HC have commonalities in their goal
structures. Particularly, the FTA and STPA modules are both
deductive in their causal reasoning which, unsurprisingly, leads
to similarities in their structure. The mitigation of a system-
level event E might be argued from two different directions:
by module CR mitigating a critical path to E, or by module
CR mitigating a failure mode having E among its effects.
D. Evidence for Safety Arguments and Level of Detail
Our pattern is built on evidence from FTA, FMEA, and
STPA results. We refer to evidence on • hazards to argue over
their proper identification, and on • countermeasures to argue
over their validity, proper implementation, and verification.
Semantic Traceability: Our modules represent separate
concerns facilitating traceability between complementary ev-
idence (e.g. Why/Is the argument complete?). State-of-the-art
patterns pinpoint that hazards have been mitigated without
clearly demonstrating why and how they have been properly
mitigated [21]. Hence, it is important to refer to the causal
chain of what exactly triggers the hazards and to how that
causal chain is to be modified to eliminate hazard sources.
Deductive Argumentation based on Good Practice:
Gaining confidence in an argument is more of a technical
problem, whereas gaining confidence in the evidence stems
from technical, social and philosophical issues [22]. We focus
on increasing confidence in the argument by an optimal way
of constructing it and zooming into (trustworthy) evidence.
The adequacy of evidence itself is out of scope here. Our
pattern allows constructing arguments directly from techniques
recommended by standards, e.g. ISO 61508 and 26262.
Our pattern supports deductive argumentation to reduce
doubt. Enhanced FTA and FMEA variants might increase the
confidence in the evidence. The pattern employs basic versions
of HA techniques, making it applicable in safety cases of any
system, e.g. independent of whether we use enhanced FMEA.
Reducing Confirmation Bias: We address the problem
of confirmation bias as the “tendency for people to favor
information that confirms their preconceptions or hypotheses,
regardless of whether the information is true” [20]. This bias
due to the goal “to show that the system is safe” is reduced
because previously conducted FTA, FMEA, and STPA use
tactics to collect evidence for the goal “to show that there are
hazards.” This way, our pattern supports two-staged arguments,
the first stage to be constructed already during the design stage
as required by, e.g. Leveson [20] and Yuan and Xu [18].
Using Specific Terminology: Our pattern contains claims
based on HA terminology. Any person reviewing the safety
case has to know HA. However, the module structure supports
exploring technical details, it is complementary to existing
patterns, and helps strengthen arguments to be assessed by
certification engineers.
E. Applicability, Soundness, and Relative Completeness
We informally investigate three criteria to argue for the
usability of the discussed pattern:
Applicability: Hawkins et al. [23] offer attributes against
which argument quality can be scrutinized. Based on
Sec. IV-A, we believe that our pattern is (i) easy to understand
and apply by software engineers and (ii) flexible enough to
be applicable to many safety-critical systems, as it has been
applied to three control systems in fairly different domains by
a group of 18 students.
Soundness: Does any instantiation of the pattern form
a sound safety argument based on FTA, FMEA, and STPA?
First, the module CR resembles not only the causal reasoning
direction, but can also directly use any result of these analyses,
i.e., any identified hazard. Second, module HC provides a
response to this hazard in terms of an identified and taken
countermeasure whose verification is part of HC. A further
discussion of this question is out of scope here (Fig. 15).
Relative Completeness: Can the pattern be instantiated
to the most relevant situations where safety cases are based on
FTA, FMEA, and STPA? Here, we elaborate on applicability
aspect (ii): The described modules capture core concepts of
Pattern
Instantiations
pi
Safety Case
Applications
ap
Soundness: ∀pi∃ap
Relative Completeness: ∀ap∃pi
Figure 15: Soundness and relative completeness
the three techniques, such that to each case where one of
these techniques is applicable we can also expect to be able
to instantiate our pattern (Fig. 15).
Assessing Hazard Analysis Techniques: Some principles
to be followed by good techniques [21] are embedded in our
pattern: Method is more important than notation emphasizes
clear description of the capabilities of a technique, speci-
fication of information sources and the analysis procedure.
Techniques should use familiar concepts and models implies
that trustworthy results should be derived from HA, using
combinations of events and conditions to model causes and
effects. Our pattern incorporates HA steps (see Sec. IV-D).
Trying to use our pattern with a new HA technique may unveil
problems if this technique violates this principle. By refining
the modules for a new technique, we can assess whether this
technique matches at least as good as the existing ones.
V. RELATED WORK
Alexander et al. [4] present patterns arguing for safe control
software by using adaptation mechanisms for improving or
maintaining safe states. Our three modules (M, CR, and HC)
are similar to their core patterns but use fewer argumentation
steps. They focus on FMEA, e.g. arguing over adaptation as
a design measure (DR) which goes beyond Solution 4 in our
countermeasure module (HC). We integrate FTA, FMEA, and
STPA and capture how safety requirements were motivated.
We aim at a compact pattern and use HA results more
directly. Their argument depicts that an identified risk structure
(i.e., failure modes as hazards and their causal factors) is
acceptable and, by adaptations as countermeasures, how this
structure got acceptable. We do not presume adaptation as a
countermeasure. Moreover, we allow the goal structure to be
built during FTA, FMEA, or STPA whereas they concentrate
on an a-posteriori construction.
Kelly [2, pp. 317ff] and the GSN standard [19] describe a
“fault tree evidence” pattern where a fault tree as a whole
serves as an evidence to derive basic safety goals. We go
more in-depth into fault tree analysis and make the argument
more precise. Similar to an application of our causal reasoning
module (CR) for FTA, [2, p. 76f] describes an argument that
includes cutsets at the level of solutions in the goal structure,
however, not elaborated as a pattern.
Hawkins and Kelly [24] present patterns for mitigation
of software-based hazards, identification and realization of
software safety requirements, and avoidance of software-based
mistakes. While their “software contribution safety argument”
module is similar to our HC module, they do not elaborate
on causal reasoning based on a specific HA and mitigation
technique. Their article does not discuss system models.
Palin and Habli [25] propose safety case pattern catalogs
for the construction of a vehicle safety case in accordance
with ISO 26262. One of the proposed catalogs, namely the
Architecture for the Argument pattern catalog, confirms the
necessity of an FMEA Argument pattern. Their paper does not
elaborate on this pattern.
For a truck information and control system, Dardar [17]
constructs an ISO 26262-compliant safety case using GSN and
SysML. He argues from a trustworthy process based on coarse
evidence from several HA and quality assurance techniques.
However, for FTA he shows a goal structure that can be seen
as an instance of our CR and HC modules for FTA.
Wagner [26] sketches an argument pattern based on STPA.
Our CR module for STPA indicates more clearly how STPA
results can be integrated into the argument. Beyond our M,
CR, and HC modules, Wagner proposes modules to capture
process- and environment-based arguments [27].
Research has been done on assurance deficits due to limita-
tions of FTA and FMEA [28], [29]. Our goal is not to tackle
these problems, but to construct confident arguments in case
of proper HA. However, these deficits need to be addressed.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We presented argumentation from the contribution of HA
techniques to a system’s safety generalized by a modular
argument pattern. We showed by an example and by discussion
that this pattern (i) captures the structure of these causal rea-
soning techniques and (ii) extracts commonalities in reasoning
and evidence among the three techniques. Furthermore, we
broke down the evidence argument based on the solutions by
using the causal reasoning and mitigation structure coming
with the HA and prepared our pattern to be integrated with
system models. Next, we asked trained master students in a
practical course to apply a preliminary version of our pattern
to construct their safety cases of real-life applications. Finally,
we added value to HA by (i) integrating results scattered across
several specialty HA techniques and (ii) integrating these
results with the additional steps required in the construction
of balanced, complete, and confident safety cases.
Future Work: After having interviewed our students, we
can evaluate the usefulness of our pattern in an experiment
with safety compliance practitioners. Confidence is increased
by the fact that the argument structure mirrors the steps and the
causal reasoning of an HA technique. Elaborating on arguing
that an application of an HA technique is trustworthy is,
however, an important direction to be investigated. Moreover,
we plan to work on a formalization for an automated pattern
instantiation. Finally, we consider a manual for using our
pattern as important for the transfer to practice.
Acknowledgments: We thank our students of the ad-
vanced practical course for applying the argument pattern in
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